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cipation Act, which gives the wife control over her own property
and the right to sue and be sued individually in the courts.6
Thus the court approached this problem from too restricted a
viewpoint in determining only whether the wife was liable
for a community debt. The rule referred to by the court that
the wife can bind herself for a community debt only by a con-
tract in writing and signed by her individually is pertinent to
conventional obligations but is irrelevant to tort obligations of
the instant type.
Maynard E. Cush
EVIDENCE-PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE IN NAME OF
WIFE-PROOF REQUIRED TO REBUT COMIVIUNITY STATUS
Immovable property was bought on credit in wife's name
during the marriage for $2,350, of which $150 was paid immedi-
ately, the balance in installments. The purchase authorized by the
husband stated that the wife was "purchasing ... for herself. .. ."
The husband mortgaged the property to the plaintiff who seeks to
enforce the mortgage through executory process. The wife seeks
to enjoin the proceedings against the property alleging, inter
alia, that it is her separate property.1 The wife's evidence tended
to prove: (1) that she had made the down payment with proceeds
of savings bonds given her by children of a previous marriage;
(2) that her husband had never had any income, and therefore
could not have paid the down payment or the credit portion;
(3) that she had received $3,000 from the sale of separate prop-
erty some nine years before the purchase; (4) that her children
and stepchildren, the oldest of which was fifteen at the time of
the purchase, had contributed toward paying the notes. The trial
court held that the property formed part of the community and
granted judgment against the husband's half of the property. 2
6. LA. R.S. 9:101 et seq. (1950). See also Art. 2278, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870;
United Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Haley, 178 La. 63, 150 So. 833 (1933).
1. The petition of the wife also alleged that the mortgage was obtained
under duress, Transcript of Record, p. 16, Succession of Franek, Dale v.
Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So.2d 670 (1954). This allegation was discussed but
apparently not decided in the original opinion.
2. Art. 2334, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870, does not state the effect of a mortgage
granted by the husband on property standing in the name of the wife when
such property is found to form part of the community. The trial court, by
granting judgment against the husband's undivided one-half interest, appar-
ently concluded that the mortgage was invalid only as to the wife's interest
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On original hearing, held, the property is separate property of
the wife, and even if it were not, a mortgage granted on property
standing in the name of the wife is invalid. On rehearing, held,
the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption that all
property bought during the marriage forms part of the commu-
nity of acquets and gains, for, even if the testimony that the prop-
erty was paid for with the separate funds of the wife is given
credence, there is no evidence that at the time of the purchase
the wife had a reasonable expectation that she could meet the
deferred payments out of her separate funds. Succession of
Franek, Dale v. Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So.2d 670 (1954).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2402 provides that all property
acquired during marriage in the name of either spouse forms
part of the community of acquets and gains. Construing this
article the courts have held that all immovable property bought
during the marriage in the name of the husband is conclusively
presumed to be community property unless the act of transfer
contains a recitation that the property is bought with separate
funds of the husband and for his separate account. 3 If immovable
property is bought during the marriage in the name of the wife,
however, the courts have held that it is not necessary that the
act of transfer contain this "double declaration"; 4 the fact that
the property is bought in the name of the wife is sufficient notice
that the property may not belong to the community. 5 The wife
can rebut the presumption that the property is community by
proving that at the time of the purchase she had the adminis-
tration of separate funds sufficient to make the purchase, and
that she made the purchase out of these funds. The court has
frequently stated and sometimes held that if the purchase was
made on credit the wife must also prove that at the time of the
purchase she had sufficient income from her separate property
to enable her reasonably to expect to be able to make the pay-
in the property. It was argued in appellant's brief that such a mortgage is
absolutely null. Original Brief on Behalf of Mrs. Mary Franek, pp. 9-10.
The court did not discuss this particular point, but the opinion on rehearing
states that the mortgage was held invalid in the original opinion. 224 La.
747, 758, 70 So.2d 670, 674 (1954).
3. See, e.g., Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274, 280, 193 So. 645, 646 (1940).
For a complete discussion of the theory of separate ownership by husband
and wife, and an analysis of the cases, see Huie, Separate Ownership of
Specific Property Versus Restitution from Community Property in Louisiana,
26 TULANE L. REV. 427 (1952).
4. Metcalf v. Clark, 8 La. Ann. 286 (1853).
5. Ibid.
6. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 295 (1841).
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ments on the credit portion.7 Under this line of cases it has been
held that even if the wife proves that she has paid all of the notes
which have fallen due, if she cannot prove that at the time of the
purchase she had income sufficient to enable her reasonably to
expect to make the payments, the property forms part of the
community.8 The wife's only recourse is to recover from the
community the sum which she has actually paid? In several
cases, however, the court has found property to be the separate
property of the wife solely because she had paid for it without
discussing whether she ever had a reasonable expectation of
being able to do so.' 0
The courts have held that the wife liad a reasonable expec-
tation of having revenues sufficient to pay the credit portion
when she had received annual income from her separate planta-
tion which income was equal to one-third of the price of the
property purchased, and could expect to receive a like sum each
year;1" and when the wife had accumulated and administered a
separate fund out of which she had paid the cash portion of the
purchase price and the first of two deferred payments and which
was sufficient to pay the last payment. 2 In most of the cases
which, after listing this rule without discussing it, held that the
property belonged to the community it was also found that the
wife had not made the down payment or any subsequent pay-
ment, and had no separate income whatever. 13 In one case, how-
ever, it was held that, since the wife's separate income was not
sufficient to justify a reasonable expectation of meeting notes
given for two pieces of property purchased the same day, both
formed part of the community, even though the installments on
one of the pieces of property had been kept up, apparently out
of the wife's separate funds.1 4 In another case, the court held
that, although the wife must as a general rule show a reasonable
7. Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904); Miller v. Handy, 33 La.
Ann. 160 (1881); Lotz v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 17 So.2d 463 (La. App.
1944).
8. Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904).
9. Ibid.
10. Rouyer v. Carroll, 47 La. Ann. 768, 17 So. 292 (1895); Cockburn v.
Wilson, 20 La. Ann. 40 (1868); Metcalf v. Clark, 8 La. Ann. 286 (1853); Hig-
ginbotham v. Anders, 69 So.2d 107 (La. App. 1953); Blake & Zaegler v.
Hackney, 1 La. App. 558 (1925).
11. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
12. Laporte v. Laporte, 9 Orl. App. 84 (La. 1911).
13. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bouanchaud, 179 La. 312, 154 So. 8 (1934);
Whittington v. Heirs of Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928); Jordy v. Muir,
51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898); Cefalu v. Hallowell, 12 Orl. App. 134 (La.
1915).
14. Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904).
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expectation of being able to pay the credit portion, special facts
could make the rule inapplicable.15 The original opinion in the
instant case did not discuss whether the wife could expect to
meet the credit portion of the purchase price. The rehearing was
granted to consider this point,'1 6 and the court seems to have
held on rehearing that even granting credence to the testimony
tending to show that the property was paid for entirely out of
the wife's separate funds, it belonged to the community because
there was no evidence to show that the wife could have expected
to meet the credit payments when she made the purchase. From
the opinion as a whole, however, it seems that the court did not
actually believe that the property had been paid for with sepa-
rate funds of the wife, and the dissent maintained that this was
the reason for reversing the original opinion.' 7
The requirement that the wife show a reasonable expectation
of being able to meet the credit payments can be traced to
Bouligny v. Fortier,s decided in 1861. In that case the husband
had authorized the wife to make a credit purchase far beyond
her means, and the creditor was proceeding against the wife, who
claimed that the purchase was actually made by the community.
The court held that while the husband could, as a general rule,
authorize his wife to make credit purchases for her separate ac-
count, he could not remove liability from the community by
authorizing her to make such "wild and ruinous speculations"' 9
as these, which obligated her to make payments she had no rea-
sonable expectation of meeting. The wife was allowed to recover
the down payment from the community and was held not liable
for the credit portion. In two subsequent cases involving credit
sales to the wife decided in 1853 and 1868 no mention was made
of this statement. The court found that the payments were made
with separate funds and held that the property was separately
owned.20 In Miller v. Handy2' creditors of the husband proceeded
against property standing in the name of the wife, which prop-
erty had been bought on credit. It was clearly established that
the wife had made the initial and all subsequent payments and
15. Succession of Lewis, 45 La. Ann. 833, 12 So. 952 (1893).
16. Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 763, 70 So.2d 670, 676 (1954) (dissent
to the opinion on rehearing).
17. Ibid.
18. Bouligny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209 (1861).
19. Id. at 214.
20. Cockburn v. Wilson, 20 La. Ann. 40 (1868); Metcalf v. Clark, 8 La.
Ann. 286 (1853).
21. 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
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was able to make the remaining payment, but the creditors urged
that under any circumstances a wife could not make a credit
purchase for her separate account. The court discussing the prior
cases mentioned Bouligny v. Fortier and said that in the case
under discussion the wife could have reasonably expected to
meet the deferred payments. After deciding that a wife could
purchase property on credit for her separate account, the court
concluded:
"It is difficult to lay down precise rules as to the limits within
which the wife's liberty to purchase on credit should be re-
stricted, but we think the following general proportions are
reasonable, viz:
"3d The wife's paraphernal property and revenues should be
ample to enable her to make the acquisition, with the rea-
sonable expectation of being able to meet the deferred pay-
ments."
22
The Handy case has been cited many times for this rule, and in
Fortier v. Barry23 the rule was applied to permit creditors of the
community to seize property standing in the name of the wife,
and on which she apparently had made the payments. Thus from
Bouligny v. Fortier, which held that when a husband authorized
his wife to bind herself for an obligation which she has no reason-
able expectation of meeting, the community is liable rather than
the wife, a rule was extracted which allowed creditors of the
community to seize property paid for by the wife.
Some of the cases intimate that a reasonable expectation
that the wife will be able to meet deferred payments is an in-
dispensable element of a credit sale to the wife. It is submitted
that there is no logical necessity for such a conclusion. In at-
tempting to determine whether the parties intended that prop-
erty be sold to the wife or to the community, the wife's ability
to pay for the property may be looked to as evidence of the true
intent of the parties, but a probable ability to pay would not
seem to be a prerequisite to a valid sale being made to the wife.
If it is found that the parties intended the property to be sold
to the wife and that the wife has paid for it, the property should
belong to her. Creditors and forced heirs of the husband should
not be permitted to recover from property purchased by a wife
22. Id. at 169.
23. Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904).
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who owes them nothing, but should look only to property pur-
chased with community funds.
Problems involving credit sales to married women will
probably diminish in the future. In 1944, the Civil Code was
amended to provide that the revenues from the separate property
of the wife accrue to the community unless the wife registers a
document stating. her intent to maintain separate administra-
tion.24 Income from a wife's occupation, trade, or business also
falls into the community unless the husband and wife are living
separate and apart.25 Thus, a wife living with her husband who
has not filed a document indicating that she retains separate ad-
ministration of her property can obtain funds to meet payments
on separate property only by selling other property or by
inheritance or gift.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
LEGISLATION-LoUISIANA REVSED STATUTES OF 1950-EFFECT
The jurisprudence concerning the effect of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950 has two branches, emphasizing the two
significant characteristics of the revision.' The first group of
cases stands for the proposition that there is a presumption
against any intended change in the substance of prior statutes.
The second group of cases holds that since the prior statutes
which were revised have been repealed expressly,2 a source
statute may not be used to alter a clear provision of the Revised
Statutes. The purpose of thisnote is to discuss the basis of these
decisions.
One purpose in enacting the Revised Statutes was to re-
organize and to clarify the general statute law so as to simplify
its use without changing its substance. The Louisiana Law
Institute was directed by legislative act, "to prepare a compre-
hensive revision of the statutes of the State of a general charac-
ter, including those contained within the revision of 1870, to
24. Art. 2386, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1944, No. 286, p.
836.
25. Art. 2334, LA. CIVIL CODs of 1870; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So.
37 (1933).
1. For a comprehensive discussion indicating the purpose and scope of
the Revised Statutes, see Bennett, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, 11
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 4 (1950).
2. La. Acts 1950(1 E.S.), No. 2, § 2, printed in 5 LA. R.S. 870 (1950).
[VOL. XV
